This essay examines the applicability of the concept of civil society to contem porary Japanese religions. The first section discusses the concept of civil soci ety, addressing the potential advantages and pitfalls of considering religious organizations alongside civil society organizations. The second section addresses issues in the history of Japanese civil society and religion. Subse quent sections present the results of an attempt to align the founding of a variety of religious organizations with a chronology of the expansion of civil society, and to examine religions， peace activism from 1999 to 2003 in the context of civil society debate about peace, with an assessment of the results.
A n y o n e r e s e a r c h in g m odern and contem porary religion is fam iliar w ith problems arising from the assumption that religion is somehow an anomaly in the modern world. No one any longer actually voices or openly advocates this position, but the absence of a clear alternative permits it to linger. Likewise, the absence of a clear theoretical statement on religion in modernization theory facilitates perpetuation of the assumption of religion's inevitable demise. Secu larization provides the rubrics for explaining religion's disappearance from most political discourse, but it does not suggest an explanation for the contin ued formation of religious organizations, their social activism, or for the con tinued salience of the older, established organizations referenced by "traditional Buddhism," Japanese Buddhist sects, their temples, priests, and parishioners. The rhetoric of decline hinders the development of a theoretical stance on modern religion that recognizes these empirical realities as normal and unexceptional.
The Concept of Civil Society
"Normal" and "unexceptional" accurately characterize traditional Buddhism. Buddhist sects have of course been a central element of Japanese history since the ancient period and constitute one of the most venerable features of Japanese society. That being the case, lack of conceptual paradigms that could facilitate analysis of their contemporary significance is a major problem for the study of Japanese religions. This conceptual vacuum probably accounts for the relative lack of research on contemporary Japanese Buddhism, which may be the leaststudied aspect of modern religious life. This paucity of research contrasts sharply with actual religious practice in Japan, where traditional Buddhism is the religious affiliation of about half the population. This paper is an experiment exploring whether religious organizations in Japan today might be understood as an element of civil society. If it could be established that religious groups share many of the characteristics of civil society organiza tions, this would establish new reasons to regard them as a normal part of the associational life of modern society, rather than as a vestige of premodern society, an anti-modern mentality, or as compensatory responses to the contradictions and disruptions inherent in modernization. If in spite of those characteristics that Support received from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and Harvard U n i versity is gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank Yoko Suemoto for nelp in gathering and compiling statistics presented in this study. distinguish religious groups as "religious," these associations can be shown never theless to conform to significant patterns seen in other kinds of civil society groups, then that would facilitate displacing exceptionalism and replacing it with a more normalized understanding of religion in modern society. Any concep tual innovation that facilitates such a change would benefit studies of religion and society, and it is in that spirit that this experiment is presented.
Civil society exists between the state and the market, on the one hand, and above the family and individual, on the other. It is composed of organizations and a space of discourse; constituent groups debate questions of public interest and strive to contribute to the public good in a multitude of ways. Its space of discourse is the "public sphere." Civil society groups are voluntary associations that seek neither power in the state nor profit in the market. They are devoted to a vast spectrum of causes, such as protection of the environment, social wel fare, the improvement of education, eradication of political corruption, and many more. The organizations may take many forms, such as labor unions, trade associations, clubs, and lobbies. They bind people together to consider how to promote their version of the good society and to take action to realize that ideal. The ties formed in these groups strengthen local communities by enhancing solidarity and creating social capital for individual members. Con temporary society's attitudes toward public issues are formed in dialogue with print, broadcast, and electronic media, which occupy most of the public sphere in modern society (H a b e r m a s 1989). The positions taken and activities organ ized by a particular group largely define its position in society.
Historically, the concept of civil society arose in part through reflections on the Protestant Reformation and the characteristically Western ideal of a separation of religion from state, yielding to toleration of a plurality of legitimate perspectives and interests, restraining the state from dictating an orthodoxy of thought ( H a ll 1995, pp. 3-7; G ellner 1995， p. 46) . It is clear that liberal, Western democracy rep resents a highly desirable goal in much civil society research. That civil society only truly exists where universal suffrage, periodic elections, a free press, an independ ent judiciary, freedoms of association, assembly, petition, religion, and academic freedom are found is a pervasive assumption (Shils 1991， pp. 5-8) .
In Japanese language civil society is either translated as shimin snalcai 市民社会 or transliterated as shibiru sosaeti. Applying the concept of civil society to Asian societies raises various questions. Robert Weller found that there was no very satisfactory way to translate the term civil society into Chinese, produc ing unwieldy neologisms such as wenmin shehui 文 民 社 会 (civilized society), gongmin shehui 公民社会(society of citizens), shimin shehui 市民社会(bourgeois or urban society), and minjian snehui 民間社会(popular society). In societies strongly influenced by Confucianism, quite different understandings of the proper relation between the state and religion than those in the West inflect the development of civil society. Yet he writes further that, "None of this, however, implies that China lacked the kinds of social capital that form the armature of Western civil society, particularly networks of horizontal ties that extended beyond the immediate family but were not themselves political." In fact, many o f these networks were formed through religious organizations ( W e lle r 1998, P. 233).
Religion and Civil Society
Religion is directly or indirectly implicated in the concept of civil society and in its historical genesis. There is, however, no clear consensus on the question whether religious organizations should be considered a part of civil society, and some of the ambiguity stems from the distinctive qualities of religious organiza tions that distinguish them from other kinds of associations. In modern society, the pursuit of a path towards salvation, following a code of personal ethics, per formance of religious ritual, and reflection upon the correct relation with deities or supernatural forces have come to be regarded as largely private mat ters lacking public significance.
Also, though membership in voluntary associations typically arises from a choice made by adults, the majority of religious affiliations arises from being born to parents already affiliated with a particular religion. This means that there is a significant overlap between kinship and religious ties, though it is of course true that other religious affiliations result from adult choices made as a result of con version, making this type of affiliation more like that involved in voluntary asso ciations. Beyond this difference, religions place obligations upon their members that are not generally regarded as matters of choice, such as belief in a deity (or supreme being [s] )， commitment to a moral code or an ideal vision of com m u nity, or following some path toward salvation, however conceptualized. Here, too, there may be overlap with other civil society groups, but the fit is not perfect.
The nature of leadership also differs, and the often-found concentration of authority and power in religious leaders exceeds that typical of secular civil society groups, creating a strong emphasis on vertical ties, whereas horizontal ties are more prominent in secular civil society groups. So far as the member ship is concerned, obedience to a leader may not be a matter of choice, or may be so only in the abstract, calling the "voluntary" nature of religious affiliation into question. Finally, it is significant that the very idea of religious affiliation as a matter of choice is a distinctly modern phenomenon, one that rests on the existence of a modern society, a separation between religion and state, and a pluralistic religious culture (H a r d a c r e 2003).
Focusing on religions， actual behavior yields another view. Larry Diam ond notes that all groups, religious or otherwise, are incompatible with civil society if they "seek to encapsulate their members within a totalistic environment that isolates them from alternative views and ties, inculcates a rigid, comprehensive ideological or philosophical belief system, and demands total obedience" (D ia m o n d 1999， p. 222). But religious groups can be either inside or outside the sphere of civil society, depending upon their focus at any given time.
A religious congregation or establishment (a church or mosque or syna gogue) may mainly function to cater to the spiritual needs of its members in parochial society. But when it becomes engaged in efforts to fight poverty, crime, and drug addiction, to improve human capital, to organize efforts for community self-improvement, or to lobby legislatures (or join constitutional cases) about public policies on abortion, sexuality, poverty, human rights, the legal treatment of religion, or a myriad of other issues, then the religious insti tution is acting in civil society.
(D ia m o n d 1999， p. 224)
Jose C a sa n o v a states bluntly that "• • • the church only becomes an institution of civil society when it ceases being a church in the Weberian sense of the term: when it gives up its monopolistic claims and recognizes religious freedom and freedom of conscience as universal and inviolable human rights" （ 2001， p. 1046).
W riting on Italian democracy, Robert Putnam and his co-researchers view Italian Catholicism since Vatican 11 as separate from and essentially antagonis tic to civil society. Survey research allows them to make clear-cut distinctions in the social orientations of Catholics and non-Catholics.
Organized religion, at least in Catholic Italy, is an alternative to the civic com munity, not a part of it.... The Italian Church retains much of the heritage of the Counter-Reformation, including an emphasis on the ecclesiastical hierar chy and the traditional virtues of obedience and acceptance of one's station in life. Vertical bonds of authority are more characteristic of the Italian Church than horizontal bonds of fellowship. At the regional level, all manifestations of religiosity and clericalism-attendance at Mass, religious (as opposed to civil) marriages, rejection of divorce, expressions of religious identity in sur veys-are negatively correlated with civic engagement. ...A t the individual level, too, religious sentiments and civic engagement seem to be mutually incompatible. O f those Italians who attend Mass more than once a week, 52 percent say they rarely read a newspaper, and 51 percent say they never discuss politics; among their avowedly irreligious compatriots, the equivalent figures are 13 percent and 17 percent.
(Putnam , Leonardy, and N a n e tti, 1993， p. 107)
In other words， the more engaged people are with Italian Catholicism, the less likely they are to become engaged in the kind of discussion of matters of public interest that characterize civil society. 2003, pp. 54-56) .
The Occupation tried to promote the growth of civil society by dissolving the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the neighborhood associations, along with semiofficial women's and youth groups. Religious groups gained more autonomy. Nevertheless, the neighborhood associations could not be eliminated, and grassroots organizations like shrine support groups (which are closely linked to the neighborhood associations) and the Society of the Bereaved (Nihon Izokukai 日本遺族会）are frequently found supporting greater state oversight in public life (G a r o n 1997， pp. 3-22).
Research on postwar Japanese civil society identifies a continuation of the theme of heavy state intervention in civil society, but after 1945 the state's main mechanism changed to bureaucratic regulation. The concept or public-interest corporations" (kdeki hopn 公益法人） ， first developed in the Meiji Civil Code of 1896， article 34， continues to provide the main rubrics for government oversight or civil society groups. Separate laws have been developed for the administration o f private school corporations (gakko hopn 学校法人） ， social welfare corpora tions (shakai fukushi hdjin 社 会 福 祉 法 人 ） ，medical corporations (iryo hdjin 医療法人） ， and religious corporations (shukyd hdjin 宗教法人） ， but all of these groups are subtypes of public interest corporations. 'Public interest has been interpreted rather narrowly, to mean "for the benefit of society in general or of many and unspecified persons, which excludes business organizations, sports clubs, alumni associations, and many other groups which actually function as civil society groups (Ya m a m o t o 1998; Ya m a o k a 1998; A m e m iy a 1998).
Public-interest corporations have to report regularly to a government ministry, which can investigate a group or revoke its legal status. The corporations, includ ing religious corporations, must submit lists of their annual activities, assets, accounts of changes of membership, financial statements, budget estimates, planned activities, and other matters.1 The agency can make on-site inspections and audits. These and similar regulations inhibit the autonomy of these civil society groups. Often there is a de facto agreement by public-interest corporations to employ ex-bureaucrats of the approving ministry, a practice called amakudari 天下り（ literally "descending from heaven")，which give those individuals significant influence in how the group develops. This and other widely publicized problems regarding public interest corporations have led to current proposals to make them subject to taxation, a move that would have immense implications for religious groups (A rai 2003) . The Asia Foundation and other foreign groups pur posefully remain outside Japanese government recognition just to avoid red tape and bureaucratic interference (Pekkanen 2002) .
Interest groups of all kinds proliferated during the first twenty years after W orld War 11， continuing to grow after that time as well. In i960, Japan had about eleven nonprofit associations for every ten thousand persons, versus Nothing more dramatically demonstrated the limitations of excessive bureaucratic regulation of civil society than the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 17 January 1995. The huge earthquake killed over six thousand people and dev astated the city of Kobe and parts of Osaka. Paralyzed by red tape and inter agency turf wars, the government's delayed and disorganized response was broadcast on television to a horrified nation. A huge outpouring of volunteers, including many religious groups, organized themselves to aid the victims in every possible way. Few of these groups had any legal status with the govern ment to provide disaster relief, but the media lauded their efforts and poured scorn on the governmental response. While it may be too early to tell whether the earthquake has initiated a lasting trend, surveys in 1997 showed that 21.5 percent of Japanese adults and 40.7 percent of college students had engaged in In order to establish comprehensively whether the civil society framewom is useful in the study of religious organizations, ideally it would be necessary at m inim um (1)to determine how the time of founding of religious organizations parallels the overall development of civil society; (2) to identify the range of civil society issues that religions engage with; (3) to determine how religions， interventions are mediated by the public sphere, and the extent to which they are known in society as a whole; and (4) to assess how the positions taken by religious groups relate to the spectrum of opinion and interventions seen across society as a whole. W ithin the present study, I tried to address aspects of the first and fourth issues above. In order to determine whether the timing of religious organizations founding bears any relation to the patterns seen broadly in the development of Japanese civil society, I collected data on the founding and number of three different types of religious organizations:(1)new religious organizations, (2) Christian organiza tions existing outside the churches, and (3) annual changes in the total number of religious corporations. I compiled the findings in accord with the chronology of the development of Japanese civil society organizations established by Tsujinaka.
Apparently it should be easy to develop a chronology of the founding of Japan ese religious groups over the twentieth century and compare that to Tsujinaka5 s three periods, but in fact this is a more complicated task than one might think.
Studies of Japanese new religions have accepted a rough outline in which a core group of religions was founded at the end of the Edo period, followed by a sec ， 1996) .3 Thus, accepted scholarship in this area has devel oped a periodization that agrees in outline with Tsujinaka、framework.
Going beyond this admittedly rather loose and "fuzzy" periodization to a more quantified presentation is difficult. Some religions identify a distinct date of "founding"; Kurozumikyo provides such an example. The group identifies its founder's first revelation in 1814 as its official founding. Other religions identify the date of their incorporation under the Religious Corporations Law as their official founding. Many others, however, show a much less clear-cut history, in which they do not necessarily pinpoint a particular foundation date. For these, one can only read the available data and try to identify when a core membership was assembled. Religions founded outside Japan pose another difficulty. The date of their founding in the home country is not nearly so significant to the question of Japanese civil society as the timing of their forming a Japanese fol lowing. In Table 1 Besides religions themselves, another type of religious association directly relevant to the development of civil society is the secondary formation within religions of service groups of all kinds. The Christian Yearbook (Kirisuto ohmbun 2004) lists a huge variety of service, charitable, evangelical, and other organizations operating alongside Christian churches. From it I identified around one thousand organizations currently operating, along with the found ing dates for nearly all of them. This work does not include data on earlier organizations that no longer exist, and in that sense it does not give a full accounting of the period 1900 to the present. It is, however, the most compre hensive source available.
Japanese Christianity shows a different pattern than new religious movements, having enjoyed significant growth before 1900， but closely scrutinized and regu lated through the period of militarism. Thus from 1900 to 1945， we see a slight decline. This was followed by a major expansion in the period 1945 to 1964， with an annual rate of growth far exceeding that seen in the founding of new religions. As Tsujinaka， s scheme would lead us to expect, the years 1965 to 1973 show a decline, with another period of expansion beginning in 1974， though at a lesser annual average than from 1945 to 1964. The overall increase is especially striking, given that Christians have never exceeded one percent of the total Japanese popu lation. Christian organizations thus show the general trend toward expansion over the twentieth century that Tsujinaka， s paradigm projects, but they do not follow its contours nearly so closely as new religious movements.
Changes in the number of religious corporations offer another kind of insight into religions， interactions with civil society. The number of religious corporations is not, however, identical with the number of religious organiza tions. Not all Japanese religious organizations are incorporated, and many of the incorporated groups were actually founded well before they incorporated. W hen the Religious Corporations Law first came into effect in 1951, the Reli gions Office (Shumuka 宗務言果）of the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Bunkacho 文イ匕庁） ， charged with administration of the law, used to track unincorporated groups, and from 1947 to i960 the number of unincorporated religions was published annually in the Shukyd nenkan (宗教年鑑 Religions Yearbook). Over those years unincorporated groups grew from around 13,300 in 1947 to about 40,000 in i960. Unfortunately, there is no reaay way to determine the number of such groups today, though they undoubtedly exist.
The The Religions Yearbook, which includes temples, shrines, Christian churches, and new religions, shows the marks of a staole system from 1952， with the exception of a few years of data that are hard to credit.6 Data from 1952 to 1964 show that the number of religious corporations rose from 178,603 in 1952 to just over 180,484 in 1964. The period from 1965 through 1972 shows a gain of about 1,000 organizations, ending at about 181,400. The historic high came in 1973， at 184,573， with a somewhat smaller peak in 1994， when the number was 184,288. From 1995， the number begins to decline. The difference between the postwar high and low is around 6,000 groups, a shift of only around 3 percent of the total. The most recent statistics put the number of Japanese religious corpora tions in 2001 at 182,6877 Because the Religious Corporations Law was instituted in 1951， and because shrines did not incorporate before that time, meaningful correspondence with Tsujinaka5 s framework cannot be drawn before the 1950s. The years 1952 to 1973 were marked by fairly consistent expansion rather than breaKing at 1964， as Tsujinaka's scheme would lead us to expect. As with new religious movements, the declining number of religious corporations after 1995 identifies the Aum incident as a watershed event.
To provide a complete accounting of the expansions and contractions of the religious world in relation to civil society as a whole, it would unquestionably be necessary to provide comparable data on Shinto and Buddhist organizations. Unfortunately, however, that task proved insurmountable in the present research. The case of Buddhist civil society organizations is exceedingly complex. From the Meiji period on, a great many Buddhist organizations have been formed, some considering how to modernize traditional practices, others establishing contacts with Buddhists outside Japan, some engaging with socialism, liberalism, and other trends of political thought, while others sought to aid the poor, evangelize over seas, or encourage patriotism. In the JJRS's special issue on Meiji Zen (1998, vol. 25/1-2), Iked a Eishun， s article documents the large number o f teaching assemblies (kydkat 教 会 )and lay societies (kessha 結 社 ) formed from the mid-i88os.
Ikeda presents a chart showing how vast numbers of such groups were founded, but he also documents a simultaneous move to merge them, to bring them under the control of the sects. Meanwhile, the sects themselves were heav ily supervised by the Home Ministry, which required them to seek approval tor all significant projects or changes (Ikeda 1998). We could see in Ikeda's mate rial the beginnings of civil society-like initiatives within traditional Buddnism, quickly co-opted by the sects themselves and then stifled under state supervi sion. Ikeda's work makes it clear that the young Buddhists of mid-Meiji sought to enter public debate on a range of topics of public interest but were usually squelched by sectarian hierarchies. There is a need to link this history to the postwar history of religious life within traditional Buddhism.
I was unable to locate a source that comprehensively lists all of these, or even all of those now extant. Preliminary research suggests that compilation of such a list would be an immense task, one more suitable to team-than to individual research. religious corporations make it difficult to draw firm conclusions on every point of correspondence, but an overall expansion from the system's beginning until the Aum Shinrikyo incident emerges clearly. The availaole data tend to confirm the hypothesis of a broad correspondence between the religious world and civil society as a whole. Lack of relevant data on Buddhism and Shinto, however, is a serious gap that would have to be addressed in order to develop tms inquiry further.
Contemporary Japanese Religions^ Engagement with しtvil Society
To go beyond the finding that religious organizations have been founded follow ing rhythms seen widely in Japan's associational life, it is important to be aole to assess religions， positions on the issues discussed by civil society organizations. I searched the database under "peace issues" (heiwa mondai 平和問題) and recovered 15,094 articles, of which 1,426 were drawn from the religious papers, but the search also uncovered some quirks in the system. Coverage of the reli gious newspapers in Japan is a major feature of the database, but while nine of these are included, the largest o f them, Seikyd Shinbun (聖教新聞)， published by Soka Gakkai as a nationally circulating daily newspaper, is not.12 Also, although the entire database was searched, nothing at all was retrieved on peace issues for the years 1984 and 1985. Furthermore, the search retrieved no articles from any of the religious newspapers before February 1999. The explanation I received for this anomaly was that the database is gradually being expanded, extending back in time from the present.1 3 This means that it remains incomplete for years before 1999. Because the database is presently most useful in searches for very contemporary material,I focused on the period February 1999 through October 2003. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the content and sources of the 1,426 articles retrieved. Table 2 shows that Cniigai Nippo, Katorikku Shinbun, Bukkyd Taimusu, and Kirisuto Smnbun have carried the most intense coverage of peace issues among the religions， newspapers. By comparison, according to the database, Shinshukyd Smnbun and Jinja Shinpd have devoted less space, by far, to the topic. As a sub scriber to Sninshukyd Shinbun, the database's report of such a low yield of peace-related articles for tms paper seemed odd to me, so I checked recent issues against the database inaex. I found in each case that several relevant arti cles had been omitted from the database, suggesting that it tends to miss or under-report relevant material, especially if the word peace" is not in the arti cle title.14 While the Lark Database is thus hardly a perfect instrument for the task, it is nevertheless the most comprehensive source for determining as accurately as possible how Japanese religions， approaches to peace issues have changed over the period 1999 to late 2003. 1 leave Shinto out in the following account, since Jinja Shinpd so seldom carried articles on peace.
During 1999， ouposition to the New Guidelines Bill (Shin gaidorain hoan alliances of religionists promoting a variety of progressive causes, stimulation of discussion, study, and social engagement, as well as the declaration of politi cal positions by significant sectarian groups, such as those from Jodo Shinshu named above. W hile these developments are very significant within the religious world, however, it is doubtful that the general public is aware of them. For example, coverage of the demonstrations on 20 March 2004 in the mainstream papers has typically been relegated to the back page, and participants have generally been described merely as a collection of citizens' groups" {shimin dantai 市民団体) . As in other countries, demonstrations in 2004 were markedly smaller than those leading up to the war. In Japan, although the public as a whole is not enthusiastic about the s d f 's deployment, and though doubts about its consti tutionality remain, resignation is supplanting outrage.
As Buddhists join with members of other religions and secular groups in peace activism, Buddnism， s distinctive contribution becomes difficult to dis cern. In a recent interview published in the Newsletter of the International Institute for the Study of Religion, a Buddmst and a Christian representative of the Religionists' Network for Peace spoke with noted scholar of contemporary Japanese religions, Usui Atsuko. The Buddhist representative, Mr. Takeda Takao of Nihonzan Myohoji, related that Buddhists， and Christians， coopera tion in activism dates only to 1999， and that since then it arises mainly in response to invitations from Christians rather than being initiated on the Bud dhist side. He also stated that while the Network has about 400 members in total, only 120 to 160 of these are Buddhist; Christians make up 60 to 70 percent of the membership. He further stated:
Buddnism has historically been very significant, but it seldom takes action, and when it does, it is not in the form of official representatives from each sect, but always individuals participating on their own.... Individual Bud dhists have a variety of opinions, but concrete activism is difficult without a priest's support. Unless their priest has a high level of concern, parismoners find it difficult to act. But now we see some activism among priests of fifty to sixty years of age. I trunk we will see some changes with the succession of gen erations. We can be somewhat hopeful, but will the change come in time? (Usui 2004) Seen in the short term, the development of Buddhist peace activism from around 1999 to the present represents a significant increase and broadening of civil society engagement. Seen in the longer view of the history of Buddhist activism going back to the Meiji period, however, some of the same factors doc umented by Ikeda Eishun as limiting engagement then are still hindrances today: the centrality of the priesthood, the difficulties of whole sects adopting political positions, and the dependence on external stimulus. In that light, however, it is highly significant that organizations as large as those participating from Jodo Shinshu have entered the fray. We must also recognize that the fleeting atten tions of the mainstream media are not currently producing wide public aware ness of religious activism. Nevertheless, the experience of civil society activism is undoubtedly broadening for the participants and exposes them to a wider range of political dissent than they would otherwise encounter.
Conclusions
This study has presented an attempt to portray Japanese religious organizations as an aspect of Japanese civil society, based on the timing of their founding and on a sample study of their engagement with peace issues. We found that religious organizations have been founded parallel to civil society as a whole, although service organizations and religions incorporating show somewhat different pat terns. The overall convergence in the founding of religious and secular civil soci ety groups suggests the existence of a shared impetus and timing in forming organizations, and that there is little justification for seeing religious organiza tions as exceptional elements in modern social history. It will be useful for social scientists to consider religious groups as one kind of organization in civil society, and useful also for scholars of religion to view fluctuations in the religious world alongside changes in civil society as a whole. Looking for similarities in the found ing or expansion of mass groups such as the postwar labor unions and postwar mass religious organizations could be illuminating on both sides. Similarly, the impetus to form smaller groups now, whether religious or secular, seems to dis tinguish the beginning of the twenty-first century from the middle of the twenti eth. Exploring these and similar problems of religion and civil society will facilitate a better understanding of religion's position in society as a whole.
Our study of changes in religions， peace activism demonstrated how m ain stream media attention can fluctuate, and that media coverage or lack of it is a major factor shaping ordinary society's knowledge and understanding of reli gion. Japanese religions，peace activism today is conducted with a new confidence that comes from being with the majority and from being able to assert confidently that peace is a central value both of religion and of society as a whole, a factor that both unites religion and society, and also qualifies religion ists to assert their leadership.
In the course of the experiment, it became apparent that a lack of crucial sources of data on Japanese Buddhism and Shinto organizations impedes com pletion of a comprehensive study of religion and civil society. Problems with the Lark Database and with government statistics on religion are another kind of impediment. Nevertheless, the civil society framework is a promising concept for the study of religions and society in Japan, enriching both religious studies and social science research.
